Norms Matter: Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism

Sofiul Ahmed
Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Presidency University, Bangalore, India,
Email Id-sofiul.ahmed@presidencyuniversity.in

ABSTRACT:

Scholars often hold the views that standards either have little bearing on international politics or have a significant impact on it. But although the latter perspective poorly explains which norms matter, how they have an impact, and how much norm influence there is in comparison to other variables, the former view ignores significant impacts that norms may have. The impact of three distinct interwar conventions on the use of force during World War II varied. The cultures of the national military organizations that mediated the impact of the international standards provide the best explanation for the variation in state adherence to these norms. This approach emphasizes the difficulty and significance of assessing the relative consequences of the often-intersecting prescriptions ingrained in various forms of social collectivises.

KEYWORDS:

Culture, International, Organization, World, War.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the interwar era, international norms and conventions have piqued the interest of theorists of international relations. This modern literature is obviously quite different from and thus superior to that of the 1920s and 1930s since it has more intellectual depth, empirical support, and explanatory power. This research holds out the hope that norms promoting free trade, preserving the environment, advancing human rights, and limiting the spread and use of heinous weapons may have a significant influence on how international relations are conducted and structured. This hope is strengthened by the opportunities of the post-cold war era. But there are also pessimists. The argument that the anarchic power-shaped international arena is not as pliable and that international rules and institutions have relatively little influence has been picked up by others, building on the stick that E. H. Carr deftly swung at idealists in a previous era. On the one hand, we are told how important international standards are, while on the other, we are warned that they are meaningless [1], [2]. How can we reconcile these conflicting claims? Which is accurate?

I contend that none of the extreme perspectives can be sustained. Norms do matter, despite what the naysayers claim. However, norms may not always important in the ways or often to the level that their supporters have claimed. Due to several conceptual and methodological flaws, the normative literature has often overstated the significance of norms. In other words, by focusing on proving that norms "matter," analysts have neglected to address the crucial questions of which norms matter, how they matter, and how much they matter in comparison to other variables. As a consequence, there is a misperception about the breadth and depth of the influence of international standards. Although recent studies have overemphasized international guidelines while ignoring norms embedded in other sorts of social organizations, such as regional, national, and subnational groupings, the social emphasis of norm analysis is still at its core [3], [4].

Due to this error, researchers have neglected important sub systemic social understandings that may conflict with and outweigh international guidelines. I examine a collection of scenarios involving the use of force where common wisdom predicts minimal influence from international prescriptions, or "least likely" cases, to evaluate the potential and constraints of concentrating on norms. The research also focuses on a time frame the years between the two world wars that the traditional history of international relations theory regards as categorically rejecting ideational internationalism. The use of chemical weapons, bombing civilian targets, and submarine strikes against commercial ships were regarded as horrific and immoral forms of warfare by the world community in the 1920s and 1930s. These prohibitive norms are intriguing and related to current initiatives because they were explicitly constructed by states who later had to decide whether adhesion to them was preferable to violation rather than simply existing as a part of the international system's "deep structure" or being

"invisible" to participants. However, the impact of these restrictions throughout World War II varied. The limits on submarine warfare were quickly disregarded by participants. They adhered to the regulations about strategic bombing for months before breaking them. Nevertheless, despite anticipation and planning, they maintained chemical weapons restrictions throughout the conflict. Why did certain standards seem to have more sway than others?

I contend that international rules had an impact on the use of force during World War II, contrary to accepted history [5], [6]. The bans influenced leaders' arguments and explanations, influenced governments' calculations and strategies, and most importantly seem to be a major factor in why certain forms of conflict were ever given consideration for restraint. International conventions were important, there is no doubt about that, but they do not explain why there were variations in the use of force. Since neither the military efficacy of the weapons nor possibilities for relative strategic advantage can explain the varied adherence of governments to the three standards, the argument is not that strategic security concerns trumped social prescriptions. Understanding organizational culture is where the solution resides instead. Although this method emphasizes communal prescriptions, national society is the main subject rather than global standards. The predominant viewpoints held by military organizations on the most effective means to wage war influenced how troops conceptualized and prepared for battle, which in turn influenced the differing effects of norms on state objectives.

There are various ramifications of this approach for the theory of international relations. First, it emphasizes the need of giving explicit ideas, looking at both successful and unsuccessful norms, and taking other explanations into account methodological innovations that may enhance both positivist and interpretivist norm research. Second, the study's findings highlight the advantages of comparing divergent norm, belief, and cultural trends in international politics. Few contemporary accounts have addressed such international injunctions in the context of national norms, despite the fact that many recent analyses have helpfully focused on global norms. However, these intrastate guidelines (i.e., those that govern corporate culture) may have a significant impact. Of course, this does not imply that national laws or relative power limits are always superseded by bureaucratic culture, but it does emphasize the need for conceptual tools to evaluate the cumulative or synergistic impacts of various cultural and material institutions [7], [8].

The article is divided into four sections. It begins by outlining the flaws of the existing norm literature and then provides a strategy to try to correct them. It then explores the reasoning for an opposing viewpoint based on corporate culture. The effectiveness of these two viewpoints in explaining state preferences for adherence to laws that restrained the use of force during World War II is next evaluated. The argument's implications for international relations theory are then discussed, with a focus on upcoming work on norms [9], [10].

On norms

Scholars have shown a growing interest in how norms—collective perceptions of appropriate actor behavior operate in international politics across a variety of theoretical and methodological stances. As opposed to being binary, norms are thought of as continuous entities that come in different degrees of strength. Norms are often portrayed by analysts as being important in terms of constituting, regulating, or facilitating actors or their contexts. The main claim is that stronger norms will have greater influence in any of these roles, regardless of whether the dependent variable is identity, interests, individual conduct, or collective practices and results. The existing norm literature has, however, been subject to three different forms of biases when examining these correlations. The first is when tautology results from failing to understand norm robustness independently of the very consequences that are ascribed to norms. This issue is made worse by the fact that analysts must deal with an apparent abundance of international rules rather than a scarcity of them. Due to this accessibility, a standard can almost always be found to "explain" or "allow" a certain result. It is crucial to understand why certain norms are more powerful than others in specific circumstances since various norms might have conflicting or even contradicting imperatives. Therefore, avoiding circular reasoning needs a definition of norm robustness that is independent of the effects to be described, regardless of whether one stresses the behavioral or the linguistic/discursive aspect of norms. This is not a simple job.

For instance, Alexander Wendt proposes that social systems (of shared knowledge) differ in their capacity for transformation, but he doesn't elaborate on what this characteristic entails. Both Friedrich Kratochwil and Robert Keohane connect a norm's power to its institutionalization in distinct ways. However, this returns the issue to one of conceptualizing the strength of institutions, a task that has historically been fraught with ambiguity or definition by impact. Another issue is that attempts to examine norms are biased in favor of the norm that "worked." The majority of norm studies concentrate on a single, particular norm, or at most, a limited collection of norms. "Effective" norms with apparent clear implications are often the norms being considered. The presence

or absence of norms, as well as their success or failure, must all be taken into account in research in order to fully comprehend how norms function. The evolving norms, principles, restrictions, and understandings that may have had an impact but did not tend to be ignored in norm research. These instances are crucial to the advancement of this theory since they were examined in combination with analogous situations of norm effectiveness. It's just as crucial to understand why norms didn't develop or weren't significant as to understand why they did.

A lack of other explanations, especially ideational ones, for the effects attributed to norms is the last (but less prevalent) issue with many research. The risks of acting otherwise are obvious. One runs the danger of falsely attributing to international standards effects (such as the development or facilitation of certain identities, interests, attitudes, or behaviors) that are better described by other sorts of causes. In order to avoid these biases, I explicitly contrast a norm approach with an alternative organizational culture explanation and, to a lesser extent, a conventional realist account. Norms that seem to have been very effective, like those prohibiting chemical warfare (CW), with those that seem to have been less so, like those concerning submarine warfare and strategic bombing.

II. DISCUSSION

I provide a conceptualization based on the three criteria of specificity, durability, and concordance to evaluate how strong the standards are. In theory, both informal and formal institutions may exhibit these three characteristics. Specificity relates to how well specified and comprehended the rules for constraint and usage are. Is there a time-consuming code that is too vague or convoluted, or is it comparatively clear and precise? Do nations disagree on the specifics of the restrictions or how to put them into effect? As a result, specificity is determined by looking at how players perceive the prohibition's clarity and brevity. The longevity of the laws and how well they hold up against challenges to its prohibitions are both measured by their durability. Do the norms have a history of being valid? Are offenders or transgressions punished, therefore upholding and perpetuating the standard? As is evident, for instance, in circumstances of incest, a norm's violation does not automatically render it invalid. The question is whether doing so is socially or internally sanctioned by actors. Examining the history of a restriction and the associated knowledge of and response to infractions by agents might help answer these concerns. Concordance refers to the degree of intersubjective agreement, or how universally recognized the norms are in diplomatic negotiations and treaties. The concordance dimension can be a double-edged sword.

Public attempts to uphold a norm could indicate its deterioration rather than its viability. The context may determine which is the case. Affirmation seems to help to robustness in the circumstances investigated here, where it is more reinforcing since the emphasis is mostly on "nascent" or emerging norms. Do states seem to agree that the regulations are acceptable? Do they put their reputations up for public confirmation as a sign of approval? Do states impose specific requirements on the restrictions they accept, reducing concordance? Or do they abide by the laws without question, never ever thinking of breaking them? Examining the transcripts of national and international talks that have included the norms can help answer these issues.

Overall, the assumption of the norm method stated above is that a prescription's influence would increase with how clear, persistent, and universally approved it is. This shows, ceteris paribus, that states' adherence to norms is most probable in regions where norms are most resilient in terms of specificity, durability, and concordance with regard to the variance in World War II. In contrast, if standards are weaker, nations will be more likely to violate them. If a norm explanation is correct, we ought to observe constraint in the regions with the most established restrictions. States' expectations for the agreement's future application should change as it becomes more integrated into global culture. Leaders should consider the norm while making choices and be aware of the consequences of deviation. Alternately, the standard could be so strong that going against it is not even thought of. Countries should take action to prevent principle violations, particularly those that are obvious, well-established, and universally accepted. Restraint is more likely to fail in places where agreements haven't been finalized or aren't fully formed. The costs of violating the law shall be considered reasonable. Leaders will try to circumvent regulations. The associated norms won't be linked to identity or self-interest. In other words, there won't be much of an impact on practices, decision-making, and actors from bans.

Organizational Culture

Combining culture and organization theory offers a new method for comprehending the conflicting uses of power during World War II. An organizational culture approach focuses on how assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that dictate how a group should handle its internal affairs and adapt to its external environment affect decisions and behaviors. This method, in a sense, concentrates on the "norms" that rule certain organizations: culture is, in fact, a collection of widely shared guidelines for what is and isn't appropriate behavior. An organizational culture viewpoint, when applied to military bureaucracies, demonstrates how government organizations with ambiguous

nominal aims (such as "provide security") focus on combat tactics that later influence organizational thought and behavior. Their primary method of conflict has a propensity to become such a hub of activity that means essentially become goals. Similar to how a theoretical paradigm or a schema molds intellectual thinking or how a schema organizes individual cognition, culture defines how organizations see and analyze their surroundings. It functions as a heuristic filter for perception and computation. There are also tangible effects of culture. Which skills are seen as superior and deserving of assistance is determined by collective views. Organizations will direct resources into culturally appropriate weaponry. These weapons will seem more practical than ones that are culturally unsuitable and hence do not get financing or attention.

However, as governments are made up of several agencies, the issue is which bureaucracy will be important and when? This article's succinct response is that a bureaucracy's influence varies with what I refer to as its organizational salience, which has at least three dimensions: the degree to which the bureaucracy has a monopoly on knowledge, the complexity of the problem, and the amount of time available for action. The impetus to change is lessened because there are no balances on organizational biases when one company has a monopoly on knowledge and no rivals. In terms of complexity, an issue's complexity influences the amount of specialized knowledge needed to make judgments. Senior authorities will be less successful in objecting to or interfering in operations as a problem becomes more complicated, and organizational biases will become more apparent. The length of the decision-making process may also influence the bureaucratic impact. Short decision-making cycles provide little time for modifying previously made plans.

All of these characteristics imply that military organizations will play a significant role in decisions on the use of force in conflict. Military operations are complicated and difficult for nonspecialists to understand, and there is often little time for changing prearranged plans. For these reasons, militaries are important participants in these scenarios. Although they may have the last say, military tendency may often outweigh civilian preferences during a conflict because to the armed forces' organizational importance. In conclusion, organizational culture is crucial because it affects organizational identity, priorities, perception, and skills in ways that noncultural techniques are unable to predict. The military will create and promote tactics that are in line with the prevailing ethos of warfighting, while those that are not will experience benign neglect. The military's organizational significance in battle may influence national policy on the use of force, even though military culture tends to be quite stable. This theory makes predictions about World War II that, ceteris paribus, a state would prioritize adherence to rules prohibiting a certain kind of conflict if that type of combat is incompatible with the culture of war-fighting of its military bureaucracy. States will favor breaches of organizational culture-friendly methods over incompatible ones.

Norms and organizational culture in World War II

I use two techniques to compare the two approaches' explanatory strengths. The first is a macro correlation of each method's propensity to forecast results across various scenarios. The second is a thorough examination of specific historical events to demonstrate the reliability of the causal processes. The instances I look at have to do with CW, strategic bombing, and submarines in World War II. These are an appropriate area of concentration since, throughout the interwar era, they represented the three principal forms of fighting that nations had thought about limiting. These three also make sense for evaluating the propositions because they "control" other variables like personalities, the root causes of conflict, the stakes at stake, and the overall international context, and they allow for variation in both the "independent" (norms and culture) and the "dependent" (state preferences on the use of force) variables. I look at a total of eight examples in the three categories. I look at Britain, Germany, and the US in terms of submarine warfare. I concentrate my strategic bombardment on Germany and Britain. Additionally, the study in CW takes into account Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union. I chose the nations either because they were the primary users or prospective users of a certain weapon of war or because their conduct was unusual. For instance, why, in June 1941, when the Soviet Union was facing a catastrophic German invasion and certain loss, had the weapons in its arsenal, and had chosen a "scorched earth" policy, did it not employ CW? Because they did not provide a similar evaluation of the norms and culture propositions or because I could not confirm that norms or culture were not epiphenomenal to strategic realist concerns, I rejected situations that may have first seemed to be relevant. Because Japan was unable to respond to American aggression with equivalent force, I, for instance, disregarded both U.S. strategic bombing including the dropping of the atom bomb and the employment of CW against Japan, eliminating a crucial balance-of-forces criterion that existed in the other examples. Despite not include the full range of potential scenarios, the list of examples reviewed is typical.

1. Macro correlation

A small-n comparison of their predictions against the results across the instances is a first method of evaluating the two competing hypotheses. This calls for the substance of their forecasts to be specified.

Measuring Norms

A sense of the relative firmness of the prohibitions in the three forms of combat is necessary for a norm account, which is based on their specificity, longevity, and concordance. I don't provide a detailed method for combining the three to get a robustness index. This exercise is somewhat interpretative, like any coding, but it advances many previous research that either provide no means of evaluating norm strength at all or do it in a tautological manner. Any assessment of robustness must take into account its independence from the impacts of the standard. The evidence supporting robustness in this case is from the time before 1939 and mostly refers to global events. The dependent variable, on the other hand, is national preferences on adherence to rules restricting the use of force after 1939 (explained below). Each of the bans on CW, strategic bombing, and submarine warfare is deserving of a detailed explanation. In submarine warfare, the use of the weapon against civilian ships and personnel rather than the weapon itself was more vilified.

Unrestricted submarine warfare, which came to be recognized as the practice of destroying commerce and passenger ships without regard for the safety of anyone on board, was seen as being illegal. The prohibition against such unfettered combat is noteworthy for being rather strong in terms of longevity, specificity, and concordance. The laws governing submarine warfare struck out as being rather robust. Attacks against ships are now subject to international restrictions that at least go back to The Hague Peace Conference in 1899. In World War I, Germany's overwhelming use of unrestricted submarine warfare sparked a considerable backlash that ultimately led to the U.S. joining the fight. Submarine bans were often discussed during the interwar years in the context of international conventions and were largely endorsed.

Most importantly, nations made care to reiterate the illegality of underwater boat assaults on commerce ships even as other international accords fell apart in the wake of mounting international tension in the late 1930s. They met in 1936 to endorse the London Protocol on Submarine Warfare, which led to the dissolution of the larger London Naval Conference. Significantly, once Italy violated the London Protocol covertly in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, other nations took measures to penalize Italy and the unrestricted assaults ceased.

Famous historians have described the regulations as being clear and binding, yet the procedure did have some issues with specificity. For instance, it was not fully obvious what constituted a "merchant ship." Although it was highly debated whether arming a ship—even for defensive reasons—made it a real combatant, Britain was adamant about maintaining the ability to arm its merchants and insisted that such weaponry did not change their status as civilians. However, even defensive weaponry posed a hazard to submarines since they were so exposed on the surface during the necessary search and seizure operations. Similarly, ambiguous were the regulations governing how to ensure the crew and passengers' safety while sinking commercial boats. Small crews on underwater boats made it common for them to be unable to leave personnel to steer the ship into port. Additionally, because to a shortage of room, they were frequently unable to bring the noncombatant's crew and passengers onboard. Countries divided on whether it was safe to place these folks on their rescue boats.

Finally, the rule had broad support in terms of concordance. Forty-eight states in all had ratified and renewed the submarine regulations prior to the conflict. They included key participants in World War II such as Britain, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Overall, of the three institutions this research looked at, the submarine rules were the most solid in terms of longevity, specificity, and concordance. The strategic bombardment was limited by the second norm. During the interwar period, statesmen put a lot of work towards reducing the number of military aircraft and/or finding measures to control conflict by establishing guidelines and limitations. They primarily aimed to distinguish between bombing civilians and fighters. Most people believed that direct combatants were valid targets for aerial attacks. All others were to be regarded as unworthy victims, bombs being dropped only on the cruel and evil.

However, concordance was poor. On the regulations, there was little international agreement. During the interwar period, there was no clear understanding of aerial bombardment in the language of treaties or in the discourse of international talks. Even while Britain and Germany formally complied with President Roosevelt's request for caution at the commencement of World War II, this last-minute agreement aroused concerns about commitment, at the very least. It is difficult to assess specificity since concordance was poor and there wasn't a definite agreement. However, generally speaking, the participants seemed to be comparing their work to that of The Hague Commission of Jurists from 1923. Even though these regulations were the most comprehensive of the

interwar period, disagreements plagued them as well. The key area of disagreement was how to define a military aim. Were civilian firms that made aircraft components an appropriate target? Was it ethical to attack military camps next to hospitals and educational institutions? Each state seemed to distinguish civilians from combatants, safe zones from war zones, and legal bombing from illegitimate bombardment in a unique manner. We can only draw the conclusion that specificity was definitely low in the absence of explicit guidelines.

As flimsy as any standards examined here were those governing strategic bombing. An agreement made at the 1899 Hague conference prohibiting the use of weapons dropped from balloons or "other new weapons of a similar nature" was related to the ban on assaulting undefended towns. At The Hague convention in 1907, the participants did not choose to add any explicit wording about airplanes, although they did reiterate the ban on assaulting undefended towns and homes. However, certain nations did attack cities during World War I. By the start of World War II, governments' express external commitment to limit bombing was only left in Franklin Roosevelt's last-minute plea. The 1923 Hague regulations, which constituted a de facto ban, were not adhered to particularly successfully in the 1930s wars in China and Spain. Overall, compared to either submarine warfare or conventional combat, air warfare standards were less established. CW was the third main objective of diplomatic efforts at this time to reduce the use of force. While there have long been laws prohibiting the use of poisonous substances, the interwar gas use standard had a mixed record of endurance. On the one hand, international law has been enforcing restrictions on chemical usage since the turn of the century. On the other hand, during World War I, nations had flagrantly broken the restrictions.

During the 1920s and 1930s, a number of conferences debated placing restrictions on the use or production of gas. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 first raised the subject of CW restrictions by forbidding Germany from utilizing, producing, or importing toxic gases or the supplies and machinery needed to create them. At the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1921–1922, CW got a lot of attention, but a clause that forbade the use of poison gas in battle was never passed. Another venue for the discussion of CW was the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. Diplomats agreed to take action once again on the CW provisions of the Washington treaty after demands to ban the export of toxic gases and associated materials were rejected. As a result of this agreement, the Geneva Protocol was born. It was the sole CW agreement reached during the interwar years, and adherence to it was fairly erratic during that time. For instance, during its war with Ethiopia in 1935, Italy broke the pact. The meager economic penalties imposed by the League of Nations in response were mostly ineffective and not implemented. When Japan used chemical weapons in China in 1938, the League of Nations and the majority of other polities chose to overlook the incident.

Moderate agreement with the norm was observed. The issue was that, before to the outbreak of war in 1939, neither Japan nor the United States formally approved the 1925 convention. In addition, Britain and France pledged to uphold the rule only in disputes with those countries who had ratified it and whose allies had done the same. This clause may have had a big impact during World War II. Because Japan was an ally of Germany and involved in CW in China, for instance, Britain's commitment of caution would no longer have been guaranteed. However, the Geneva Protocol was clear and concise. If the opposing side was a signatory and shown caution as well, signatory states would not use CW first. There were just a few very small exceptions. Was it illegal, for instance, for powerful explosives to discharge minute quantities of chemicals? Another problem was the use of non-lethal gas, such tear gas. Some nations, like the US, sought the ability to use non-lethal gases to manage their own populations. The anti-CW norm was often stronger than the restrictions on strategic bombing but less than the restrictions on submarine warfare.

2. Micro assessment of Causal Mechanisms

In three respects, the macro comparison has to be complemented by a deeper examination of the specifics of World War II. It first gives a clearer idea of the substance and application of analytical notions like organizational culture and norms. Second, correlation does not by itself provide us with information about what led to the apparent link, as experienced methodologists are keen to point out. Better verification of the causal processes proposed by each method is made possible by microanalysis. Finally, such analysis is helpful for ensuring that the claimed linkages are not fictitious as a result of some other factor. Political-military advantage is one obvious option. A "strategic realist" perspective would argue that, particularly in times of conflict, nations pick their tactics according to how they are anticipated to advance their strategic objectives; states would choose to violate norms when they anticipate receiving corresponding military or political gains from doing so. Escalation is likely in cases when infractions strengthen a state's position. Adherence is also more probable when escalation may result in a relative loss or disadvantage.

The British submarine warfare instance is the main subject of my microanalysis. [A section on German submarine warfare is omitted to save space.] Due to space restrictions, this scenario provides the most analytical sway. Submarine warfare had the most solid norm, therefore its impacts should be seen their most keenly. Additionally, the British instance seems to provide a priori justification for the effect of norms since British choices were consistent with the expectations of the norm theory. However, a close examination of the decision-making process demonstrates that this link is problematic and that organizational culture was the more important contributing factor.

British Submarine Warfare

As expected by conventions, corporate cultures, and strategic benefit arguments, Britain chose prudence in this situation. Examining the decision-making process in this instance helps in determining the relative effect of the three since it expands the set of theoretically relevant observations and enables the distinction of causal processes. British assessments on the submarine regulations took place at two crucial points: before to and after German escalation. There are various reasons for British choices and actions before to the German escalation. A strong inclination for restraint may be seen in the toughness of the submarine standard and Britain's especially active involvement in supporting it throughout the interwar era. Because Britain relied on commerce and was protected by a sizable surface force, strategic realism also foresees caution and notes that the employment of submarines could only be detrimental. The same outcomes were anticipated from the perspective of organizational culture: Navy orthodoxy envisaged relatively few uses for the submarine, supporting norm adherence.

After Germany had breached the submarine regulations in October 1939, while Britain continued to exercise restraint, a second stage developed that enables us to separate out the three hypotheses. At this moment, a strategic perspective would predict an escalation. Because Germany had already broken the norms, Britain no longer had any motive to prefer adherence to the standard because it no longer had to worry that its own usage would prompt the more expensive German reprisal. More importantly, submarines may immediately serve a strategic purpose. Iron ore, a vital component of Nazi war manufacturing, was being imported by merchant ships into Germany from both Sweden and, during the winter, Norway. Some suggested in October that this trafficking should be stopped using British submarines. The iron ore was sent to Narvik and transported through Norwegian coastal waters, across the Skagerrak, and Kattegat because ice-bound Baltic ports prevented ships from entering them during the winter. However, these areas were also where unrestricted submarine warfare would be most effective, and British surface ships would either be vulnerable or would violate Norwegian waters.

An anticipation, thought, desire, or behavior that reflects the requirements of the undersea rules or worries about the consequences of breaking them is predicted by a norm viewpoint. This view held that Britain ought to have responded similarly to Germany's escalation as quid pro quo restraint was the norm. Britain should have swung toward escalation, if only to reinforce the norm, but it did not. Norms may have influenced Britain's decision-making, but they were not crucial, according to some data. In particular, at least a portion of the process is captured by a perspective that acknowledges both the influence of normative restrictions and strategic considerations. It became more obvious that Germany was breaking the norms of submarine warfare in the early autumn of 1939. Nine out of the 31 recorded events involving the submarine regulations were infractions as of October 5th, according to the British Foreign Office, making a long list of crimes.

III. CONCLUSION

We are forced to consider the past, notably the interwar years, as a result of the current explosion of study on international rules. The two decades before World War II have historically served as a classic illustration demonstrating the futility of practical efforts based on the efficacy of standards in crucial crises. Undoubtedly, neither the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor the League of Nations successfully outlawed war. However, not all bans were ineffective at this trying time for international institutions. Strangely enough, governments fighting for existence varied or went beyond the anticipated use of specific military force, in part due to deliberately created international restrictions on such kinds of combat. However, the limitations of concentrating just on international rules are clearly clear when one asks which norms matter.

The durability of such standards throughout World War II was not correlated with how actors thought and behaved or with systemic results. But in contrast to the realist response, neither comparative capacities nor the circumstances of states served as the main driving force. Instead, it was the organizational cultures of armies that greatly shaped how nations saw their circumstances, the kinds of capabilities they valued, and ultimately whether it was preferable to defy the rules or uphold mutual restraint. The way armies and countries thought about fighting was not reducible to either international rules or strategic opportunities, which means that these cultures

had a notable autonomous influence relative to both norms and the balance of power. Naturally, the way people responded to the restrictions during World War II was not only a product of corporate culture. As was evident in the aforementioned situations, both worries about international regulations and strategic advantage were important. A synthetic model, for instance, might develop an explanation of norm influence that takes into account both the robustness of international prescriptions and the impact of national-level social understandings like political or organizational culture. Although I have evaluated these variables as competing hypotheses here, a synthetic model might do so.

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