

Agreements and the Durability of Peace

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ABSTRACT:

Factors affect whether fighting ceases after a war, and can be done to promote a lasting peace contend, drawing on theories of cooperation, that belligerents may overcome barriers to peace by taking actions that change incentives, lessen ambiguity about intentions, and control mishaps. A response contends that agreements are essentially epiphenomenal, indicating the underlying likelihood of a war's restart. Find that better agreements increase the longevity of peace after controlling for variables that impact the baseline chances for peace, such as the decisiveness of victory, the cost of war, relative capabilities, and others. The length of peace is particularly impacted by policies like the establishment of demilitarized zones, explicit third-party assurances, peacekeeping, and joint commissions for conflict resolution. Agreements are more than just pieces of paper; their substance is crucial to building a lasting peace.

KEYWORDS:

Agreements, Cease-Fire Agreements, War.

I. INTRODUCTION

Why does peace hold in certain places but not others? What, if anything, can be done to improve how long peace lasts after war? Some cease-fires persist for a few days or weeks, while others hold for many years or permanently. Why, for instance, did the first cease-fire in the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict collapse within three months whereas the second one lasted for years? Why does peace between North and South Korea persist despite constant tensions but it often breaks down between India and Pakistan? Surprisingly little theoretical or empirical research has focused on this crucial issue. States have used a variety of techniques to try to make preserving peace simpler. These procedures are often carried out in conjunction with a cease-fire agreement. To attempt to improve the chances for peace, states create demilitarized zones, accept international peacekeeping operations, set up dispute resolution processes, sign formal agreements, and take other actions. Are these actions effective? Why, if so? This article explores this subject by examining the length of peace after the conclusion of major international conflicts between 1946 and 1997.

To support its claim that such actions aid adversaries in overcoming the cooperation issue inherent in post-conflict societies, it builds and relies upon theories of international cooperation. International relations students have long studied how agents may cooperate even while anarchy prevents the creation of enforceable contracts, drawing on contractual theory and the new economics of organization literature. This line of research highlights a variety of ways that cease-fire agreements may affect the likelihood of preserving peace [1], [2]. I contend that procedures built into agreements may increase the likelihood of a long-lasting peace by altering the incentives to violate a cease-fire, lowering the level of ambiguity around acts and intentions, and preventing unintentional breaches from igniting new hostilities. If this claim is true, then the longevity of peace should depend on the terms of cease-fire agreements. All other things being equal, these actions ought to be linked to more lasting peace, both individually and collectively [3], [4].

Realist international relations scholars would probably contend that cease-fire agreements and the measures included within them are, at best, epiphenomenal. According to these academics, agreements may reflect other elements that have an impact on durability, but claims that they independently influence the prospects for long-term peace are unrealistic. According to this perspective, agreements are only "scraps of paper." They should not have any independent influence on international conduct, least of all on choices regarding war and peace, since they are not legally enforceable under anarchic systems. Therefore, it is necessary to account for other variables that influence the baseline chances for peace in order to examine the impact of agreements on the longevity of peace. Agreement mechanisms will be seen to be worthless if they have no impact if these factors are taken into account. The case that even lethal foes may overcome the barriers to collaboration would be supported if agreements matter even when the baseline possibilities are taken into consideration [5], [6].

In order to explain how various procedures inside cease-fire agreements could impact the sustainability of peace, the cooperation theory is developed in the first portion of this article. According to this viewpoint, actions including force reduction, the establishment of demilitarized zones, formal cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping, third-party assurances, and dispute resolution processes ought to aid in fostering a lasting peace. All other things being equal, the longer peace should persist, the more of these measures that are applied. This section also presents the opposing viewpoint and looks at other factors that may be predicted to have an impact on the baseline possibilities for peace. The data collection of international war ceasefires and the econometric model that were used to test these assumptions are both described in the second part. The conclusions, which are provided in the third section, demonstrate that agreements are more than just pieces of paper and that the application of certain processes inside cease-fire agreements may contribute to the maintenance of peace. Strong agreements produce peace that lasts longer. For the purposes of this research, peace is simply the absence of conflict. I do not discriminate between relationships that improve and those that sour despite the lack of conflict. According to my definition, there has been "peace" between North and South Korea for 50 years. It is obvious that not all types of peace are equally desirable, and that stability does not always correspond to social fairness. However, the majority of conflicts result in poverty, sickness, and social unrest in addition to the widespread loss of human lives. Conflict that keeps happening just makes these tragedies worse. In addition to showing that nations can overcome barriers to preserving peace in conflict-torn regions, this research also provides the most efficient methods for doing so [7], [8].

Cooperation theory and agreements

Working together is necessary to keep the peace after a conflict. There is a common interest in averting escalating hostilities since war is expensive. But there is no guarantee that this common interest would result in peace. Recent belligerents had fiercely competing interests and great motivations to exploit one another. They have cause to be wary of one another's motives as well. As a result, cooperation is difficult to develop. I contend that cease-fire agreements may promote cooperation in a number of ways, including by altering incentives, lowering confusion about actions and intentions, and preventing unintentional cease-fire breaches. Three underlying presuppositions support this argument: (1) that states are rationally led [but not as unitary agents; (2) that fighting is expensive and not something that should be done for its own sake; and (3) that each side in a conflict has reasons to want to exploit the other side or legitimate concerns about the motives of the other side. I do not believe that all sides are equally able to negotiate a cease-fire. In conflict, there are often victors and losers, and the acceptance of the cease-fire by at least one side may have been "coerced." In a battle, both sides may impose costs on one another, hence the issue of collaboration persists till one side is entirely vanquished [9], [10].

Conflicting interests encourage combatants to violate the cease-fire in an effort to obtain an advantage alone on the battlefield. This is the well-known prisoner's dilemma game. There may also be circumstances in which neither party, even when unchallenged, would prefer to assault. Actors can't learn this in a simple manner, however. Following a conflict, there emerges a climate of utter distrust in which both sides have strong cause to dread an assault by the other. Even when complete knowledge would always result in collaboration, uncertainty and anxiety about the other person's motives might weaken it. States that have recently participated in deadly war are more susceptible to security dilemma dynamics and associated spirals of fear and hatred. Incidents along the cease-fire line, even if unintentional or the product of rogue troops, may rekindle hostilities since communication routes were cut off during the war and opponents were prone to assume the worst about each other. A fragile peace exists.

The barriers to peace are shown via a fictional situation. Imagine two nations that recently engaged in conflict over a certain region (like Israel and Syria in 1973 or El Salvador and Honduras during the 1969 Football War). The two states would each desire more of the disputed area, ideally all of it, but they would both rather not engage in another expensive war. Both sides consider it to be theirs by right, and any occupancy of it by the enemy is seen as a mockery at home. The war's losing side has a motivation to strive to reclaim its lost area, while the winning side could think it can now expand its claims. Therefore, both sides are motivated to attempt to encroach upon one another or even to make a significant advance in order to move the cease-fire line closer to the opposing side.

II. DISCUSSION

Additionally, there are valid reasons for both nations to worry about invasion or attack by the other. Leaders' incendiary comments intended for domestic consumption have probably made these anxieties worse. Any military moves, supply operations, or anything else that may be a sign of a fresh assault will be closely watched by both sides. When the battle ceased, troops were probably left confronting their adversaries "eyeball-to-

eyeball" across the cease-fire line. There is a good likelihood that soldiers may fire across the line or engage in skirmishes as each side strives to strengthen its position. Unauthorized assaults or advances may occur if irregular forces participated in the conflict or if command and control is not strictly enforced. Such minor disputes may quickly turn into larger ones in such a tight climate of distrust and the closure of usual diplomatic channels. The likelihood of war breaking out once again is great, whether by intentional action, spirals of fear and preemption, accident and involuntary defection, or any combination of these. Even while peace would benefit all parties, it cannot be achieved by merely declaring it. Their promises to maintain the peace are not believable. In order to coerce a partner into cooperating and perhaps letting down its guard and opening itself up to assault, an actor with hostile intents has an incentive to claim it would uphold the cease-fire. Naturally, there is no external enforcement authority in international relations to stop players from acting dishonestly. This is the main issue with collaboration in anarchic global relations.

So how can ferocious foes ever come to peace? Mutual deterrence and reciprocity are key components of cease-fire agreements. When one side quits fighting, the other side reciprocates. Each side will retaliate in kind if the other violates the cease-fire. Attacks are discouraged by the potential for retaliation. This may seem rather evident since it is so essential to the idea of a cease-fire. However, in order for reciprocity and deterrence to be effective, a number of conditions must hold true: the cost of escalating conflict must be greater than the incentives to attack; it must be simple to distinguish compliance from noncompliance; both sides must be reassured about one another's intentions, particularly if there is a military benefit to striking first; and accidents must be prevented from starting new conflicts. These requirements hint to potential barriers to peace as well as solutions. In order to maintain peace, cease-fire agreements may use three different sorts of strategies: eliminating confusion about actions and intentions; avoiding or managing inadvertent breaches; and altering incentives by making it more expensive to attack. These tactics indicate certain observable processes, the results of which are examined in the sections that follow.

1. Altering Incentives

The world community and combatants may take actions to raise the costs of an assault. By doing these actions, belligerents may negotiate more openly with one another, decreasing the likelihood of conflict again. By physically restricting their capacity to fight, adversaries might put themselves in a difficult situation. Remobilization for war is made more challenging by the removal of soldiers from the front lines, the establishment of a demilitarized buffer zone, and weapons control. These activities also greatly reduce the likelihood of a successful surprise strike. By publicly proclaiming their ceasefire, the parties to the conflict may also be able to change the incentives. States enact international law by signing a formal agreement. Naturally, international law does not have the same legal force as domestic law since there is no higher authority to enforce it. It is possible to violate international accords, but doing so puts one's country at danger of losing military and financial assistance from other countries and justifies the opposing side's retribution. Thus, the formal and public proclamation of a cease-fire has audience costs on a global scale. A cease-fire may also be imposed by actors with the aid of outsiders. A third party's promise to keep the peace also acts as a deterrent by making breaking the agreement more expensive. In the case of defection, a third party guarantor assumes some of the liability for reprisal. A physical and moral barrier to enforce the cease-fire may also be provided by peacekeeping soldiers stationed between opposing armies.

2. Reducing Uncertainty About Actions and Intentions

The rules of a ceasefire might be spelled out in agreements to lessen confusion. The precise position of the cease-fire line being marked creates a focal point that may assist thwart efforts to move the line in favor of one side or the other using a "salami tactic." It is easier to identify compliance and noncompliance when the terms of the cease-fire are precisely stated, which helps to minimize misunderstandings and unneeded stress. The agreement's specificity will determine how much ambiguity there is on what constitutes compliance. Verification procedures may allay worries about seeing an opponent's aggressive tactics in time to strike back. As opposed to other types of agreements, cease-fire agreements may place less emphasis on monitoring since governments are more likely to depend on national intelligence to forewarn of attacks and because it is hard to conceal aggression once it has begun. However, impartial arbitrators may be crucial in promoting long-lasting peace. States will attempt to attribute the cause of any conflict to the other side since it is expensive to be seen as the aggressor. Without impartial witnesses, claims of being the victim of violence are not believable, and disagreements about "who started it" are inescapable. Monitors are crucial for separating unjustified hostility from justified retaliation because they can look into situations and provide neutral information on compliance. Therefore, objective monitoring is often necessary to determine the worldwide audience costs of violating a cease-fire. Physical

limitations, audience costs, and third-party assurances or peacekeeping operations alter the incentives of belligerents but also act as crucial signaling tools that might lessen confusion over intentions.

Accepting steps that make conflict more expensive is a reliable indicator of good intentions. Those that are considering an assault will be less ready to support policies that raise the financial or political costs of conflict than those with higher moral standards. Critics could counter that this concedes the idea that agreements are just epiphenomenal; only those who want to uphold the cease-fire would consent to robust procedures, but it is the intentions, not the mechanisms, that are causally responsible. This claim cannot be refuted since intentions cannot be measured a priori (if they could, international relations would be radically different and maybe war would not even exist). However, it also misses the mark. Of course, intentions are important. Agreements' capacity to provide dependable means of conveying these intentions and resolving the security conundrum has an impact on how long peace lasts.

In the abstract, there are two separate causal routes that are conceivable: one where agreement mechanisms actively impact peace by enforcing state obligations or disseminating knowledge, and another where mechanisms just convey intentions. The two routes are not, however, as readily distinguished in practice. Signals are only trustworthy if they are expensive, according to the literature on signaling and "cheap talk," if there are incentives to falsify, as there undoubtedly are among dangerous opponents. It is expensive and hence plausible for a state to restrict its capacity to conduct war or to make itself vulnerable to inspection. In other words, the more immediate impacts of agreement mechanisms play a significant role in the indirect signaling function.

3. Preventing Accidents

Reciprocal techniques may be very susceptible to errors and miscommunications. The scenario may soon deteriorate back into open warfare if forces cross the line of the cease-fire or unintentionally fire, which would provoke retaliation from the other side. Rogue forces hostile to peace might quickly disturb it by breaking the cease-fire and inciting retribution if commanders do not exert complete control over their soldiers (or, in certain situations, over civilians). By avoiding misunderstandings and providing a venue for settling disagreements before a chain of retribution is set off, ongoing talks and conflict resolution processes might lessen this hazard. However, communication by itself may not always be believable since both parties have a motivation to attribute infractions to accidents or rebel groups. Arms control, force reduction, and buffer zones may all work to avoid accidents and misunderstandings altogether. It is possible to avoid misunderstandings and dispel suspicions by using "confidence-building measures" to control and make transparent behavior (such as military drills) that is likely to generate conflict. In order to avoid purposeful defection, cease-fire agreements often hold each state accountable for breaches that originate on its own soil. Agreements may also include specific internal control measures to address the issue of "involuntary defection." In addition to serving as referees, foreign observers look into and settle minor altercations and conflicts to prevent them from becoming worse.

This theory presents an institutionalist defense of mechanisms for removing barriers to cooperation. According to my theory, agreements may increase the longevity of peace by making it more expensive to violate a cease-fire, lowering uncertainty, and preventing and managing mishaps. Although these three methods of keeping the peace are discussed individually, they are all closely related, and many mechanisms have several uses. For instance, peacekeeper surveillance decreases uncertainty by guaranteeing that spies will be apprehended. This increases the price of starting a new conflict as well. In reality, a large portion of peacekeepers' daily tasks include mediating conflicts and preventing them from getting out of hand. Physical limitations that change the incentives for conflict also inevitably lower anxieties about imminent assault and lower the probability of accidents. As a credible statement of commitment, the readiness of the belligerents to take action to limit their options and increase the cost of an assault lessens uncertainty and makes mishaps simpler to manage. The tactics of increasing costs, decreasing uncertainty, and managing accidents consequently overlap in practice even if they are conceptually separate. Direct observation of the tactics themselves is impossible. However, the precise mechanisms mentioned above may be seen, and their consequences can be objectively verified. I concentrate on the following actions: force reduction, demilitarized zone creation, and arms control, measures to rein in potentially rogue groups, third-party involvement, peacekeeping, confidence-boosting measures, dispute resolution procedures, agreement specificity, and whether or not agreements are explicit or implicit. The quantity and breadth of the actions taken as part of a cease-fire are referred to as the "strength of agreement" in this sentence. The strength of an agreement can range from none, which occurs when there is no agreement or no implementation of any of the above-mentioned measures (as happened when the second war between China and Vietnam simply ended without a real cease-fire agreement), to very strong, which occurs when an agreement is formal, very specific, implements significant buffer zones, peacekeepers, and other confidence-building measures, etc. (The accords negotiated during the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt, as well as the

Korean Armistice, are examples.) The greater the agreement put in place, *ceteris paribus*, the longer peace should last according to the cooperation hypothesis presented here. Additionally, a longer-lasting peace should be linked to each specific measure. These processes are thought to improve the stability of peace both together and independently.

4. Governmental Agreement

Apolitical methods of preventing conflict include changing incentives, lowering uncertainty, and managing mishaps. However, a deal's political implications should also be taken into consideration. If at all feasible, resolving the root causes of the dispute is a strategy to make fighting unnecessary. Stability should be impacted by whether a deal seeks to resolve the political disputes that sparked the conflict rather than just putting an end to fighting. Due to the rarity of core political disputes being resolved in the post-World War II period, whether by negotiation or force, I concentrate on the more mechanical methods of keeping peace. Nevertheless, one should anticipate a durable peace to accompany a settlement of important political concerns, whether it is forced or negotiated amicably. Unsurprisingly, a very long-lasting peace results from political consensus on the problems that sparked the conflict. In actuality, there are no instances of a political settlement being openly accepted by both parties and the war afterwards resuming in the conflicts under consideration. However, as was already indicated, such settlements are extremely uncommon in the post-World War II era. The Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt, the Iran-Iraq War, in which Iraq ceded the Shatt al'-Arab waterway to secure its flank as the Gulf War broke out, and the Gulf War itself, in which Iraq formally renounced its claim to Kuwait when it surrendered, were the only three wars that resulted in an explicit agreement on the fundamental dispute over which the war was fought. As in the Korean Armistice, wars that conclude with the fundamental questions unresolved are more often than not.

Settlements are still rather uncommon, even if one counts settlements imposed unilaterally by a clear winner (but without formal admission by the vanquished side, as in the Falklands). This *de facto* classification also seems to be very steady. None of these forced agreements have fallen through. Unsurprisingly, the greatest approach to secure peace is to resolve the underlying political problems. But most belligerents won't find much utility in this advice. The additional techniques looked at in this research can be employed to keep peace while the fundamental problems are still up for debate. While some researchers of international relations may be startled to find that nations can take steps to remove barriers to peace, practitioners undoubtedly already know this. They see value in this study since it teaches them which systems function more effectively than others. One cannot draw as firm of inferences about this as one may want since these measurements are often used in tandem with one another. However, the history of cease-fires over the last 50 years indicates that establishing buffer zones between rival forces is extremely successful. The establishment of joint commissions to talk about the inevitable disagreements and misunderstandings that develop after combat, as well as making the conditions of the cease-fire as precise as possible, are also vital. Although formal agreements, force reductions, and confidence-boosting measures are not harmful, there is less conclusive evidence that they are beneficial.

For their part, outsider's eager to support belligerents in maintaining peace might raise the likelihood of success by offering a clearly stated guarantee of the cease-fire and by committing international observers or soldiers to act as peacekeepers. However, parties outside of the conflict should be mindful that mediation to achieve a cease-fire can ultimately backfire. Peacekeeping might quickly lose its credibility. It doesn't help the chances of peace to continue a mission after it has failed. States' ability to take action to lessen the likelihood of a new conflict begs the issue of whether there is more that can be done to stop a conflict from starting in the first place. Can demilitarized zones or peacekeeping aid in preserving peace before a conflict if they can do so after one? Obviously, without a more thorough investigation, it is impossible to provide a definite response to this issue, but the above-discussed precautions ought to work. The difficulty will probably lie in persuading nations to put them into practice. Taking action to secure peace after a conflict is natural and, thus, more politically acceptable. Of course, it is more challenging to enable foreign troops to violate their sovereignty or to cede land to establish a buffer zone before hostilities start.

Whether or not the strategies examined here can help prevent war from breaking out in the first place, I have demonstrated that strategies to lessen uncertainty, change incentives, and manage accidents can help keep peace in the most difficult situations, such as between deadly enemies who have strong incentives to take advantage of one another and in an environment of deep mistrust. It is challenging to keep the peace, but even fierce rivals may and do take steps to prevent more conflict. It takes effort to establish a lasting peace, but it is doable.

III. CONCLUSION

Is it inevitable that certain war-torn regions will experience strife and violence again, or is there anything that can be done to increase the likelihood of peace? The research presented in this paper supports optimism. Even if it is difficult to preserve peace between deadly foes, methods used in the framework of cease-fire agreements may help lower the likelihood of future conflicts. Although fragile, peace is a possibility. Agreements are more than just pieces of paper; their substance determines whether peace holds or whether conflict breaks out again. Building peace might be challenging in certain situations but not in others. It is more challenging when conflicts have a long history, when one side's very life is at stake, and when hostilities finish in stalemates. Although it may appear more difficult for neighbors, governments that have recently engaged in a bloody conflict have a stronger interest to prevent additional carnage. However, knowing these facts, governments may take action to increase the likelihood of peace. I have concentrated on policies that: change incentives by making an attack more expensive politically or physically; reduce uncertainty by defining compliance; control activities that are likely to cause conflict; or assist in preventing or managing accidents that could turn into war. Do these actions promote enduring peace? I discover that they typically do. When better agreements and more of these measures are implemented, peace often lasts longer. Strong agreements, according to a counterargument, are only linked to lasting peace when they are enforced in straightforward situations. When the baseline possibilities for peace are taken into account, however, the impacts of accords do not disappear.

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