Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post-war Europe

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ABSTRACT:

International committees and courts are established by the majority of formal international human rights regimes to hold countries liable to their own populations for only internally focused activity. The literature is predominantly two sided. "Realist" theories contend that the strongest democracies force or persuade lesser nations to embrace standards, while "ideational" theories contend that transnational dissemination and persuasion processes socialize less democratic governments to accept norms. The fight against potential dangers to domestic democratic governance is delegated by governments in an egotistical manner. Therefore, newer, less established democracies will significantly choose binding and enforceable human rights responsibilities rather than existing, strong democracies. I put this claim to the test using the European Convention on Human Rights, which is now the most effective system of formal international human rights safeguards. The republican liberal account is supported by the historical record of its formation, which includes national views, negotiation strategies, and private discussions. My argument is then theoretically generalized and applied to other human rights regimes, the coordination of conservative reaction, international trade, and monetary policy. Governments are said to give up sovereignty to international regimes in order to reduce domestic political uncertainty and "lock in" more credible policies.

KEYWORDS:

Domestic, Democratic, Government, Human Rights, Regimes.

I. INTRODUCTION

The UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights' 50th anniversary is a good time to reexamine the justifications for why nations establish global systems for resolving disputes and upholding human rights. These regimes include those formed in accordance with the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). These agreements' goals and methods are different from those of the majority of other structured forms of international cooperation. International human rights institutions are not intended primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders, unlike international institutions that govern trade, monetary, environmental, or security policy. Instead, they are intended to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities.

Furthermore, human rights regimes are not often enforced through interstate conflict, in contrast to the majority of international systems [1], [2]. Although most agreements provide governments the statutory authority to challenge one another, such challenges seldom ever happen. Instead, what makes these regimes unique is that they provide every citizen the ability to file a lawsuit to contest their own government's internal policies. Even when domestic rules or laws have been passed and implemented through fully democratic processes consistent with the domestic rule of law, independent courts and commissions attached to such regimes frequently respond to such individual claims by finding that their application violates international agreements. The Westphalia ideal of state sovereignty, which underpins realist international relations theory and classical international law, as well as the liberal ideals of direct democratic legitimacy and self-determination, though less frequently noted, are fundamentally challenged by international agreements to adjudicate human rights. These arrangements' postwar evolution has been accurately described as the most "radical development in the entire history of international law [3], [4]."

Take the ECHR, for instance, which was founded under the supervision of the Council of Europe and is headquartered in Strasbourg, France. The ECHR system is usually regarded as the "most advanced and effective" international mechanism in place today for officially upholding human rights. Since the ECHR's entry into force

in 1953, it has worked to outline and uphold a specific set of civil and political rights for every person within the authority of its member states, regardless of whether they are citizens, refugees, immigrants, or stateless people. A Commission on Human Rights was first constituted to examine petitions. The Commission might look into the situation, try to resolve it, or, under certain conditions, refer it to a human rights tribunal, whose rulings governments must abide by the law. All of the member states subsequently ratified two optional provisions of the ECHR, Articles 25 and 46, which allow for state-to-state and individual petitions and acknowledge the court's exclusive authority. Subsequently, the treaty has been directly or indirectly adopted into domestic legislation by other European nations [5], [6].

These factors make the ECHR Court's declaration that the convention is "a constitutional document of European public order" accurate. Analysts concur that during the last 50 years, the legal obligations and enforcement procedures established by the ECHR have created "effective supranational adjudication" in Europe. According to two eminent international law academics, compliance is so constant that ECHR rulings are now "as effective as those of any domestic court." In thousands of instances where a clear decision has been made or a "friendly settlement" has been reached, such as in cases involving criminal procedure, penal codes and the treatment of prisoners, vagrancy legislation, civil codes, systems of legal aid fees and civil legal advice, the rights of illegitimate children, military codes, expropriation policies, systems of awarding building permits, treatment of the mentally ill, reformatory centers, wiretapping, and censorship of the press. The British government stated its commitment to abide by the court's recent decision that the ban of homosexuals from the British military services violated the ECHR. Here, a serious theoretical conundrum exists. Why would any government, democratic or autocratic, support the creation of a strong independent international body whose primary objective is to restrain its domestic sovereignty in such a blatantly intrusive and non-majoritarian way?

Political scientists often support a realist or an idealistic account for the establishment and growth of formal human rights regimes in order to respond to problems like these. Realistically speaking, democratic governments and internationally engaged citizens of democratic civil society either force or encourage other countries to uphold human rights standards. Some academics advocate for both viewpoints at once, contending that strong democracies are convinced to enforce human rights standards via coercion for genuinely ideological reasons. Even though they are common among academics, these realist and ideational conjectures have very little empirical support. There has only been a large amount of study on the UN system, a noticeably weak regime, and this body of work concentrates on rhetorical declarations like the UN Declaration rather than systems for adjudication and enforcement. Furthermore, these approaches have a tendency to accept commentators' and practitioners' ex post hypotheses without question [7], [8].

In this essay, competing hypotheses for the creation of formal international human rights regimes are subjected to the first comprehensive empirical examination. It achieves this by looking at the discussions that took place in 1949–1950 to create the ECHR. on my argument, neither major powers, as realist theory would have it, nor governments and transnational organizations founded on long-established liberal democracies, as the ideational account would have it, were the main proponents of enforceable international human rights commitments in postwar Europe. Established democracies sided with dictatorships and transitional governments in opposition to reciprocally binding human rights enforcement, despite the fact that they backed certain human rights declarations. This is a seldom seen trend for which realists and ideational theorists have no explanation. The administrations of freshly founded democracies were instead the main advocates of reciprocally obligatory human rights responsibilities [9], [10].

Only if we use a different theoretical premise the domestic political self-interest of national governments can we explain this peculiar trend. Similar to creating a local court or administrative body, establishing an international human rights framework is an act of political delegation. Creating a quasi-independent judicial body is a strategy used by governments to "lock in" and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability in the face of non-democratic political threats, according to a "republican liberal" perspective, which is connected to institutional variations of "democratic peace" theory as well as to the analysis of "two-level games" and public-choice theories of delegation. In conclusion, when an international agreement efficiently enforces a particular country's policy choices at a certain moment against future domestic political alternatives, that government will resort to international enforcement.

I contend that when the advantages of lowering upcoming political uncertainty balance the "sovereignty costs" of membership, nations will choose this strategy. Therefore, freshly founded democracies are most likely to benefit from "self-binding," since they have the strongest incentive to preserve the current internal political order in the face of challenges from outside the democratic system. As a result, we should see them take the initiative in multilaterally enforcing human rights, while established democracies have an incentive to provide at best tepid

assistance. This theoretical approach explains the cross-national pattern of support for binding standards, the strategies governments used, and the historical record of both public rhetoric and private domestic discussions in the case of the ECHR the best. The ramifications of this strategy extend well beyond postwar human rights in Europe. Regardless of whether their substantive content is "liberal," the logic of "locking in" credible domestic policies through international commitments can be applied to other human rights regimes, including the recently established International Criminal Court, and unilateral human rights policies, not least the United States' apparent anomalous behavior. The latter include the synchronization of monetary and trade policies as well as the stability of authoritarian governments under the Concert of Europe and Comintern.

II.   DISCUSSION

Existing Theories of International Human Rights Cooperation

Existing research focuses on two forms of interstate interaction: coercion and normative persuasion, in an effort to understand why national governments create and uphold formal international human rights rules. These define separate "realist" and "ideational" theories for the rise of human rights regimes, respectively.

1.   Interstate Influence: "For Developed Nations, This Is Predictable"

The distribution of interstate bargaining power is emphasized in realist theories of international relations and, hence, the history of human rights regimes. Both the standard realist bargaining theory and the hegemonic stability theory predict that governments accept international responsibilities because great powers externalize their ideology and force them to do so. Every government strives to retain complete domestic sovereignty. The cost of compulsion or incentive, which is inversely proportionate to the concentration of power and is the main barrier to collaboration since governments are universally suspicious of external limitations. A hegemonic ("k") group of great powers that are ready to use force or other methods to persuade refractory governments to embrace, adapt to, and uphold international human rights principles are therefore necessary for the establishment of an enforceable human rights framework. An international regime is more likely to establish and flourish when relative power capabilities are concentrated more tightly. This puts more pressure on refractory states.

The realism argument has been put out in many ways. Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and other classical realists contend that liberal ideology, such as respect for human rights, is used by governments to defend the pursuit of geopolitical interest. "Much of the explanation for the Inter-American human rights regime lies in power, particularly the dominant power of the United States," argues Jack Donnelly of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. "It is probably best understood in these terms." To assure its construction and maintain its functioning, the United States used its hegemonic might. When he predicts that human rights regimes would be weaker than nuclear nonproliferation regimes since the former are of less relevance to the main superpower security interests, John Ruggie unexpectedly adopts a similar stance. 'Like some earlier great powers, we the United States can identify the presumed duty of the rich and powerful to help others with our own beliefs. England claimed to bear the white man's burden; France had its mission civilisatrice. For countries at the top, this is predictable behavior,' says Kenneth Waltz. Alison Biysk connects Western donor nations' pressure on international financial institutions like the World Bank to the adoption of human rights principles.

2.   Normative Persuasion: ''The Inescapable Ideological Appeal of Human Rights''

The most popular theoretic justifications for the development and upkeep of human rights regimes focus on compassion and the persuasiveness of moral convictions. Such theories are, in part, based on what were formerly referred to as "utopian" or "idealist" premises. Such theories are fundamentally based on the predominance of idealistic or charitable reasons for promoting liberal principles. Governments abide by enforceable international human rights standards because the ideals that underpin them have a strong intellectual and moral pull. According to Donnelly, who supports a variety of views, "the seemingly inescapable ideological appeal of human rights in the postwar world" is "an important element in the rise of international human rights regimes."

Ideational arguments are fundamentally different from realist arguments in that they depend on a unique understanding of interstate interaction. They specifically reject choice-theoretic underpinnings and place an emphasis on the ability of normative moral speech to change people instead. According to this perspective, a crucial aspect of political activity in this domain is that it is "principled"; in other words, the actors' altruistic and moral motivations have weight in and of themselves. Accordingly, transnational socialization, or the "logic of appropriateness," is the primary driving factor behind human rights regimes rather than rational adaptation or even coercion. Many of these interpretations contend that the influence of "principled" nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on local and international opinion causes changes in actor identities. In order to develop a

normative discourse of human rights, NGOs and publics inside established democracies created international networks, epistemological communities, and global discourses on human rights. As a result, local and international civil society are subsequently mobilized, ultimately influencing both domestic and foreign politicians.

Why are human rights so appealing ideologically? Some academics point to regional cultures, significant historical occurrences, or human moral psychology, but the most logical theory ties support for international human rights protection to domestic democracy and adherence to the "rule of law." According to this theory, known as "liberal constructivism" by Thomas Risse, established democratic governments work to spread their national principles overseas and support others who do the same. Their adherence to human rights principles is more probable the more democratic they are. States that are prepared to bow to the rule of law and civil society are more inclined to surrender to its international parallels, according to Charles and Clifford Kupchan's hypothesis. Kathryn Sikkink makes a similar claim about how advanced democracies play a leadership role in advancing human rights, connecting Scandinavia's support for human rights enforcement to the prominence of social democratic ideas in their domestic politics. According to Thomas Franck, adherence to international law is a result of normative acceptance of those norms, which in turn reflects (among other things) how well those standards align with domestic values. In conclusion, governments support norms at home because they believe doing so is "appropriate" whereas governments support standards overseas because they are compatible with universal principles that they uphold.

According to this theory, the desire to adhere to accepted concepts and standards of state conduct also known as "collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity") not only regulates state behavior but also creates and destroys state identities. These theories clearly reject explanations that base their conclusions on calculations regarding the creation of legitimate domestic government. For instance, the argument I'll make later that governments promote human rights laws to advance partisan and public interest in reducing domestic violence and interstate conflict is expressly rejected by two prominent ideational theorists. These analysts make a startling historical conjecture that governments could not have looked to human rights regimes in the 1940s and 1950s to preserve the "democratic peace," as such founding moments "came well before the emergence of the new social knowledge" that undemocratic regimes undermine peace, a belief they collectively attribute to research by liberal international relations theorists in the early 1980s, led by Michael Doyle. Inasmuch as it undervalues the capacity of nonacademics to produce a broadly accepted, factually based, and ultimately accurate consensus about global politics, as we shall see, this conflation of "social knowledge" with academic political science misrepresents the true origins of human rights regimes.

3. The ''New Orthodoxy'': A Curious Convergence of Realism and Idealism

Human rights research brings together strange bedfellows. Although realist and ideational theories begin with quite distinct presumptions, they tend to converge in their predictions about human rights. A shaky combination of these two ideas underlies the majority of current assessments of human rights regimes. Human rights standards are reflections of domestic values, not only propagandists' reasons for pursuing national security goals, according to the realists previously mentioned. Many in both schools take what Robert Keohane has referred to as the realist "fall-back" position, which holds that public interest groups with idealistic values, possibly transnationally organized, shape the democratic great powers' underlying preferences. These powers then use their preponderant power to create and enforce international human rights norms. The position of major powers is explained by idealism; the dissemination of standards is explained by realism. For instance, while making generalizations about human rights regimes, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink place a significant emphasis on the transcultural attraction of ideas, the density of transnational organization, and the susceptibility of targets to penalties (both ideational and realist aspects). As we've seen, they openly contrast this explanation with one that relies on domestic institutional and material preconditions, which they categorically reject as at best merely secondary (on theoretical, not empirical grounds).

In contrast to what broad theoretical labels may imply, actual predictions regarding the source of support for human rights regimes therefore show a lot more convergence. The majority of theories, whether realist or idealist, anticipate that governments, interest groups, and public opinion in mature democracies lead attempts to develop and uphold global human rights frameworks, and they convince, entice, or compel others to follow. But this isn't the case, as I'll explain in greater detail later. Established democracies in postwar Europe, as at the UN during this time, continuously resisted duties relating to reciprocally enforceable human rights and did not pressure or convince anybody else to embrace them. Therefore, it is important to look at a third theory for how human rights regimes come to be before going on to the empirical examination.

Republican Liberalism: Democratic Peace and Domestic Commitment

The incentives for building human rights regimes are seen as including international pressure or persuasion in realist and ideational explanations, but a "republican liberal" interpretation sees them as deriving from instrumental calculations about domestic politics. Republican liberal views often place a strong emphasis on the influence of various domestic political institutions, particularly the breadth and bias of political representation, on foreign policy. The family of republican liberal theories offers a much wider range of potential explanations, including theories of the role of cartelized elites and independent militaries in provoking war as well as interest group capture (or the countervailing delegation of authority to strong executives) in foreign economic policy. Institutional explanations of the "democratic peace" are among the most well-known of these theories. Republican liberal theories hold that states are self-interested and rational in their pursuit of (varying) underlying national interests, which in turn reflect variation in the nature of domestic social pressures and representative institutions. This is in contrast to idealist theories, which assume that social actors are responsive to external socialization and frequently motivated by altruism.

Assuming that international institutional commitments, like domestic institutional commitments, are self-interested ways of "locking in" specific preferred domestic policies - at home and abroad - in the face of future political uncertainty is a helpful republican liberal starting point for the current problem. This presumption treats domestic politics as a game in which politicians compete to exercise public authority. It is consistent with republican liberalism and draws on theories frequently used to explain domestic delegation to courts and regulatory authorities in American and comparative politics. Most political institutions, according to Terry Moe, "arise out of a politics of structural choice in which the winners use their fleeting hold on public authority to design new structures and impose them on the polity as a whole." The institutional methods by which political victors pursue their own interests, often at the enormous price of political losers, are institutions. Institutions are tools of coercion and redistribution.

The establishment of courts, administrative agencies, central banks, and other independent authorities by governments enables political winners to compel the public to adopt their favored policies. According to this viewpoint, a sitting government must examine two intersecting factors before deciding to delegate to an independent body: limiting government discretion and lowering domestic political uncertainty. First, think about the loss of national autonomy, sometimes known as the sovereignty cost of delegation to an international authority in the international arena. Governments in positions of authority like to retain short-term discretion to influence social behavior or redistribute money as they see appropriate, all other factors being equal. Since there is always some "agency cost" associated with the functioning of central banks, administrative agencies, courts, and other quasi-independent political bodies, they are naturally cautious of delegation to independent judges or officials. Judges, in particular, may attempt to overturn governmental decisions by declaring them invalid outright or failing to apply the law properly.

The protection of governmental discretion translates into the protection of national sovereignty on a global scale. The "sovereignty cost" of delegating to an international judge is probably much higher than that of delegating to a local judge, all other things being equal. One explanation is that internal variance is likely to be less than cross-national heterogeneity in terms of the particular structure, extent, application, and enforcement of human rights. The approach is a major innovation, especially for countries without a constitutional court, of which Britain is a conspicuous example. According to this viewpoint, the protection of "national sovereignty" is, in part, a justifiable defense of national principles, political cultures, and even democratic practices. This is a dilemma that the authors of post-World War II human rights texts (and their academic advisors) were well aware of. Why would a national government, whether or not it is democratic, consent to such external normative and structural restraints on its sovereignty?

The second key factor that affects a government's choice to assign authority to a separate political entity reducing political uncertainty holds the key to the solution. According to the republican liberal point of view, politicians provide human rights regimes, including domestic courts and administrative bodies, the authority to impose restrictions on the actions of future national governments. A politician must constantly consider the possibility that, "while the right to exercise public authority happens to be theirs today, other political actors with different and possibly opposing interests may gain that right tomorrow," as stated by Moe. Government authorities may thus try to "lock in" preferred policies in this manner, therefore protecting them from the acts of future administrations, in order to minimize the effects of this potential outcome. According to this viewpoint, human rights standards are manifestations of democratic governments' self-interest in "locking in" democratic governance via the implementation of human rights.

Governments seek to establish dependable judicial constraints on future nondemocratic governments or on democratically elected governments that may seek (as in interwar Italy and Germany) to subvert democracy from within by entrusting interpretation to independent authorities managed in part by foreign governments, or, to put it another way, by alienating sovereignty to an international body. This "two-level" commitment, to use the terminology of international relations theory, "ties the hands" of future administrations, so bolstering the legitimacy of present domestic policies and institutions. Worldwide limitations that are salient and symbolic act as triggers for local, and maybe also transnational and worldwide, resistance to any violation of the democratic system. Therefore, democratic governments work to stop political regress or "backsliding" towards tyranny.

According to this perspective, the relative weight of these two fundamental elements will determine whether any particular country would support a system for the binding implementation of international human rights: Establishing human rights regimes is weighed against by sovereignty costs, however increased political stability may be weighed in its favor. It follows that a country is most likely to support a human rights regime when its government is firmly committed to democratic governance but faces significant internal challenges that could endanger it in the future. This is assuming that the inconvenience government's face is constant (or randomly distributed). Its readiness to put up with the costs of sovereignty rises to the extent that the advantages of lessening internal political uncertainty exceed the disadvantages. If the republican liberal point of view is valid, newly founded and possibly unstable democracies should provide the most forceful support for legally obligatory human rights regimes.

The forecast that established liberal democracies would join dictatorships in rejecting contractual commitments is less evident and stands in stark contrast to realist and idealist views. Governments in established democracies run a somewhat greater danger of de facto nullification of domestic laws as a result of assuming enforceable commitments, but there is no commensurate increase in the stability of domestic democracy itself, which is already quite stable. Such governments have the right to reject any reciprocal imposition of international adjudication and enforcement of human rights claims; in fact, such a rejection is politically justified. This is not to argue that developed democracies do not sometimes have reasons to support international human rights laws. According to republican liberal theory, established democracies have an incentive to support such agreements for others, which may carry a small risk of future pressure on established democracies to strengthen their commitment, in order to support the "democratic peace" by promoting democracy in neighboring countries. This is most likely to happen when democracy is anticipated to strengthen resistance to a shared nondemocratic opponent or appease a potentially dangerous neighbor. In such circumstances, it is reasonable to anticipate that established democracies would embrace human rights rhetorical pronouncements and regimes with discretionary enforcement that bind established democracies but exempt itself. However, there is no reason to think that this worry will prevail over domestic interests, thus it is probable that they will continue to be averse to laws that are mutually enforceable. In the next part, further observable implications relating to national strategies and private conversations are established.

Testing the hypotheses: the ECHR negotiations

What perspective does the ECHR's negotiation history provide on the strength of these three opposing theories? Under the direction of the Council of Europe, the ECHR was negotiated between 1949 and 1953. A group should be established to guarantee respect for human rights throughout Europe, according to a recommendation made by the legal committee of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly at its first meeting in September 1949, which was presided over by the Frenchman Pierre-Henri Teitgen. The overall structure and chronology of the ECHR's creation are all primarily explained by realist, ideational, and liberal institutional theories. Realists saw this time as the start of the "American century" and the beginning of the bipolar confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. It happened just after the Holocaust, a significant historical event with strong moral ramifications for ideational theorists, and right after the ascent to significant Western leadership of two long-standing democratic role models, the United States and the United Kingdom. Republican liberals would note that a surge of new liberal democracies formed (or reemerged) across Western Europe in the early postwar period. Since nondemocratic institutions were generally believed to have contributed to both World War II and the Cold War, the democratization of West European countries like Germany, Italy, and others was considered as a safeguard against the resurgence of fascism and the expansion of communism. As a result, we need more precise data than a mere coincidence of time or the availability of sporadic public rhetorical explanation in order to evaluate the relative relevance of these three feasible ideas.

III. CONCLUSION

The process of democratic delegation and international collaboration is responsible for the development of human rights regimes in post-World War II Europe. This analysis has shown that the development of these regimes was the product of collective democratic state efforts to transfer authority to supranational organizations, not just of individual state acts. These organizations were able to develop and uphold human rights norms that cut across international borders because to this delegation. Intergovernmental organizations were essential in this process because they gave democratic governments a forum for cooperation and the negotiation of universal human rights standards. Comprehensive human rights regimes were established as a result of state collaboration motivated by shared democratic objectives and a determination to stop the recurrence of massive human rights violations. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these human rights regimes in post-World War II Europe. In a territory that had seen significant destruction and human rights abuses during the conflict, they offered a framework for defending individual rights and advancing democratic ideals. Furthermore, the emergence of these regimes provided a template for other places facing comparable difficulties, setting a precedent for the growth of human rights regimes across the globe.

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