International Journal of Innovative Research in Computer Science & Technology (IJIRCST)
ISSN: 2347-5552, Volume-10, Special Issue-9, September-2022
Innovative Projects 2022
Organized by Presidency University, Bangalore, India

A Complete Description on Compliance

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ABSTRACT:

International law and international relations academics are starting a fresh conversation on adhering to international accords. This essay puts up some fundamental ideas to organize that conversation. First, it suggests that the degree of conformity with international agreements is fundamentally impossible to measure using empirical methods. It is neither a statement of fact nor even a testable hypothesis that states normally abide by the terms of their international accords, or that they do so when doing so serves their own interests. They are, instead, opposing heuristic presumptions. There are several justifications offered for the viability and use of the background assumption of a predisposition to comply. Second, compliance issues often do not result from a conscious choice to break an international agreement based on a calculation of benefit. The article offers a number of other explanations for why governments could violate their treaty duties and explains why, in many cases, such explanations are appropriately accepted by others as justifications for seeming violations of contractual standards. Third, a degree of general compliance that is "acceptable" in light of the interests and concerns the treaty is meant to defend does not need to be and should not be required of the treaty system as a whole. It is taken into account how the acceptable level is chosen and modified.

KEYWORDS:

Foreign Policy, International, Parties, State, Treaty.

I. INTRODUCTION

Every state's foreign policy action includes the negotiation, acceptance, and implementation of international accords in today's more interconnected and complicated globe. International agreements may be official or informal, bilateral or multiparty, universal or regional in scope. Our issue is with current accords that have a significant political impact in areas like security, economy, and the environment, where the treaty serves as a key structural component of a more comprehensive international regulatory system. Some of these agreements are only generic expressions of intent, while others offer specific guidelines for a certain area of interaction. Still others could be broad agreements to foster consensus in advance of more detailed regulation. The majority of the problematic accords are now multilateral. We think that when countries engage into such an international agreement, they gradually change their interactions, relationships, and expectations of one another to conform to its provisions. In other words, they will abide by the promises they have made to some degree. For the first time in fifty years, the potential of meaningful conversation between international attorneys and students of international relations has developed in the literature and discussion on how or why this should be the case. This post discusses some fundamental ideas that, in our opinion, should frame this conversation [1], [2].

First, it is impossible to thoroughly empirically verify the general degree of conformity with international accords. It is assumed rather than stated as fact or even a hypothesis that should be investigated that states normally abide by the terms of their international accords and that they do so when it is "in their interests to do so." We provide some justifications for why we believe the underlying assumption of a predisposition to cooperate is reasonable and practical. Second, issues with compliance often do not signify a conscious choice to break an international agreement based on an analysis of competing interests. We put out a number of other (and in our opinion more frequent) explanations for why states may violate their treaty duties and why, under certain conditions, these explanations are accepted by the parties as justification for such departures. Third, a degree of general compliance that is "acceptable" in light of the interests and concerns the treaty is meant to defend does not need to be and should not be required of the treaty system as a whole. We take into account how the "acceptable level" is established and modified [3], [4].

Background assumption

Virtually all states "observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time," according to Louis Henkin. The observation is widely disputed or supported by empirical evidence. A little amount of thought reveals that creating a statistical methodology that would provide such proof would not be simple. How, for instance, would Iraq's unwavering adherence to the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey be taken into account when weighing the invasions of Iran and Kuwait? The position of the mainstream realist international relations theory, which dates back to Machiavelli, that "a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant," cannot be empirically validated for similar reasons. The power and elegance of the realist formula are significantly diminished by the extension that contemporary realists accept: the interest in other parties' reciprocal observance of treaty norms or a more general interest in the state's reputation as a trustworthy contractual partner should be counted in the trade-off of costs and benefits on which a decision is based.

The issue of whether a state honored a specific treaty duty, much less its treaty responsibilities generally, solely when it was in its advantage to do so cannot be answered rigorously or non-tautologically by mathematics. Both the normative and the realist claims have a wealth of anecdotal evidence, but none of them can be statistically or empirically proven. The main distinction between the two schools is not one of reality, but rather of the underlying presupposition that guides their approaches to the topic. Choosing a background assumption is thus crucial for every research of compliance. This decision should not be made based on whether the assumption is "true" or "false," but rather on whether it would be useful for the specific investigation. Therefore, the realist premise of a unitary rational agent maximizing utilities spread over smooth preference curves may be useful for game-theoretic approaches that concentrate on the abstract nature of the interaction between states. The notion of "rational behavior," as Thomas Schelling put it at the outset of his seminal book, "is a potent one for the production of theory." It will be decided afterwards if the resultant theory offers useful or inadequate insight into real behavior [5], [6].

Our goal in doing this work is to increase the likelihood that treaties will be followed, both while they are being written and subsequently when the parties are obligated to do so. From this vantage point, the standard realist approach, which concentrates on a small number of externally defined "interests", is not particularly useful in maintaining or enhancing state military and economic power. The manipulation of costs and gains determined in terms of those interests leads to the imposition of economic or military penalties, which is how compliance may be improved. These are seldom utilized in practice because they are expensive, difficult to deploy, and of dubious usefulness. Analytical focus is being directed away from a broad variety of institutional and political processes that, in reality, shoulder the responsibility of improving treaty compliance. The background assumption of a general predisposition of governments to comply with international responsibilities, which is the premise on which most practitioners carry out their work, appears more informative for a study of the techniques by which compliance might be increased [7], [8].

Efficiency

Making a decision is not a free good. Governmental resources are expensive and scarce for policy analysis and decision-making. People and organizations try to save their resources for the most important and urgent issues. In these situations, conventional economic theory opposes the ongoing recalculation of costs and benefits in the absence of strong evidence that the situation has altered since the first choice. Consistent policy is essential for efficiency. Recalculation is not necessary in areas of activity covered by treaty commitments; instead, the established norm should be followed. Economic analysis might arrive at the same conclusion differently than organization theory. It replaces a "satisficing" model of limited rationality that responds to issues as they emerge and looks for answers within a comfortable and habituated repertoire for the continually calculating, maximizing rational agent. This research assumes that bureaucratic organizations operate in accordance with routines and SOPs, which are often outlined by authoritative rules and regulations. Like the passing of any other legislation, the acceptance of a treaty creates an authorized set of rules. The typical organizational assumption is compliance [9], [10].

Of course, the bureaucracy is not uniform, and both proponents and detractors of the treaty system are likely to be there. When a rule is relevant, whether it be one found in a treaty or not, resistance often arises during rule implementation and takes the shape of disagreements over how the rule should be interpreted and how exactly the duty should be defined. Such disputes are resolved in line with customary bureaucratic processes, where the presumption is once again in favor of "following the rule."

II. DISCUSSION

Interests

The claim that nations only uphold treaty obligations when doing so serves to indicate that obligations are somehow unconnected to interests. In actuality, the reverse is true. The fundamental tenet of international law is that no state may be made to be legally obligated without that state's permission. Therefore, the state is not required to sign a treaty that does not serve its interests in the first place. More significantly, a treaty does not provide the state a straightforward binary choice: to sign or not to sign. Treaties are products of political decision and social life, much as other legal agreements. The way they are created and completed is intended to guarantee that the end outcome, in some way, reflects an accommodation of the interests of the negotiating nations. Modern treaty-making, like legislation in a democratic society, may be understood as a creative endeavor in which the parties explore, redefine, and sometimes discover their interests in addition to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of commitment. It functions best as a learning process in which concepts of national interest as well as national viewpoints grow. Both inside each country and globally, this process is ongoing. The development of national positions in advance of treaty talks requires extensive interagency vetting in a state with a highly established bureaucracy. distinct authorities participate in what may be described as an ongoing internal negotiation since they have distinct tasks and goals. Every significant American foreign negotiation exhibits the process.

For instance, the final U.S. position "was drafted by the State Department and was formally cleared by the Departments of Commerce and Energy, The Council on Environmental Quality, EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], NASA, NOAA [National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration], OMB [Office of Managed Business]," at the conclusion of what Ambassador Richard Benedick refers to as "the interagency minuet" in preparation for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Along with this intimidating alphabet soup, other White House departments including the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Policy Development, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy also participated. According to Trimble, "each agency has a distinctive perspective from which it views the process and which influences the position it advocates." Before a position is ever placed on the table, all of these interests must be accommodated, compromised, or overridden by the President. Involvement of Congress, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the general public has increased in recent years in the United States, introducing a new spectrum of interests that must eventually be represented in the national perspective. Similar trends seem to be developing in other democracies.

The more deliberate process used in treaty making may help to identify and reinforce longer-range interests and values. In contrast to daily foreign policy decision-making, which is heavily weighted toward short-term costs and benefits and is oriented toward current political exigencies and impending deadlines, treaty making is more deliberate. Since they can be given operational responsibility under any agreement that is achieved, officials involved in establishing the negotiation stance often have another incentive to adopt a long-term perspective. Once the treaty is in place, their words and actions at the negotiation table can come back to haunt them. Furthermore, they are likely to place a high priority on the creation of governing standards that may be used to forecast the conduct of the parties over time. All of these converging factors have the tendency to steer national stances toward broad conceptions of the national interest, which, if appropriately expressed in the treaty, would encourage compliance. For current regulatory treaties, the internal study, negotiation, and assessment of the advantages, costs, and repercussions are repeated on a global scale. Long before official talks start, the problems are examined in international fora in preparation of discussions. The negotiation process itself is characterized by intergovernmental discussion that often lasts years and includes not just other national governments but also international bureaucracies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea is the most notable example.

This process lasted for more than ten years and gave rise to numerous committees, subcommittees, and working groups, only for the United States, which had initially sponsored the negotiations, to torpedo them in the end. The structure of current environmental debates on ozone and global warming is strikingly similar to the Law of the Sea. Eight years prior to the ratification of the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the UN Environment Program (UNEP) called the first meeting on stratospheric ozone in 1977. Prior to the official start of the climate change discussions in February 1991, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was established by the World Meteorological Organization and the UNEP to study concerns of scientific, technical, and policy responses, worked for two years. A large portion of these negotiations are subject to some level of public scrutiny, which repeatedly prompts national bureaucratic and political evaluation and amendment of preliminary agreements among impacted stakeholders. Therefore, it is probable that the treaty as it is ultimately

signed and put out for ratification will be founded on thoughtful and well-developed conceptions of national interest that have in turn been somewhat molded by the planning and negotiation process.

Of course, signing a treaty requires more than just consent. The structure of the international system, in which some governments are far more powerful than others, has a significant impact on negotiations. As previously said, a new U.S. government considered the Convention of the Law of the Sea to be intolerable, putting an end to more than ten years of international negotiations. On the other side, a multilateral negotiation arena gives weaker governments the chance to establish alliances and take advantage of blocking positions. The "land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states" caucus, which comprised such odd allies as Hungary, Switzerland, Austria, Uganda, Nepal, and Bolivia, held a vital strategic position in the same UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. In the international climate discussions, the Association of Small Island States—chaired by Vanuatu—played a similar role. The international treaty-making process offers plenty of flexibility for accommodating conflicting interests, much like domestic law. Even the most powerful state won't be able to fully realize its goals in such a situation, and some parties could be forced to accept considerably less. The agreement must be a compromise; it is "a bargain that has been made." The solution could not be perfect from the perspective of any state's specific interests. However, compliance challenges and enforcement concerns are probably solvable if the agreement is carefully structured, rational, understandable, and with a realistic eye to predictable patterns of activity and interaction. The actual issue, rather than only disobedience, is likely to be that the initial contract did not sufficiently represent the interests of individuals who would be living under it if noncompliance and enforcement problems are pervasive.

It is true that a state may face different incentives during the treaty negotiation stage compared to those it will when the time for compliance comes. Particularly those on the receiving end of the compromise may have a cause to want to get out of the commitments they have made. However, just the act of establishing promises that are contained in an international agreement alters the calculation at the compliance stage, as it creates expectations of compliance in others that must be taken into account. Furthermore, while governments may be aware that they may break their treaty obligations in an emergency, they do not enter into accords with the expectation that they would be able to do so often. Therefore, the parties' assessments of the costs and risks of their own compliance as well as their expectations for other parties' compliance will have an impact on the structure of the substantive agreement. If compliance is unlikely, crucial parties could be reluctant to accept or enforce strict requirements. However, it does not always mean that the negotiation will fail. The outcome may be a looser, more inclusive involvement. Such a result is often criticized as being the lowest common denominator conclusion, leaving out the genuinely crucial information. However, it could signal the start of a serious and organized response to the issue.

The treaty that enters into effect also doesn't stay fixed and unchanged. To be effective, agreements must be flexible enough to accommodate societal, technical, economic, and political changes that are unavoidable. Of course, a treaty may be legally altered or modified by the insertion of a protocol, but these procedures are long and onerous, and since they are subject to the same ratification procedure as the original treaty, they may be thwarted or avoided by an unhappy party. Treaty lawyers have thus developed a variety of strategies to address the issue of adaptation without calling for formal modification. The simplest method is to provide an organ designated by the treaty the authority to "interpret" the agreement. After all, the U.S. Constitution has evolved through time not largely via the process of amendment but rather through the Supreme Court's interpretation of its wide terms. This authority is granted to the Governing Board by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement, and it has been used to address a number of important issues, including the crucial question of "conditionality," which concerns whether or not withdrawals from the fund's resources may be contingent on the economic performance of the member making the withdrawal.

A number of treaties provide the parties the power to vote on making rules on technical issues that are subsequently binding on all parties (often by a special majority), but frequently with the option to opt out. With regard to operational and safety issues in international air transport, the International Civil Aeronautics Organization has such authority. "Technical" issues may be included in an appendix to many regulatory treaties, where they may be changed by a vote of the parties. In conclusion, treaties often include self-adjusting mechanisms that enable them to be and frequently are in fact modified to reflect changing interests of the parties.

Norms

States that ratify treaties are recognised to be subject to their legal obligations. People often agree that they must follow the law, whether as a consequence of socialization or another factor. States are the same way. It is often said that pacta sunt servanda translated as "treaties are to be obeyed" is the basic principle of international law.

They form a part of the legislation in numerous nations, including the United States. As a result, a clause in an agreement that a state has legally ratified carries with it a duty to uphold and presumes to be a directive. This idea permeates everyday discourse and even appears in the words of national leaders. However, the realism claim that all national decisions must be made only on the basis of calculations of interests including the interest in stability and predictability offered by a set of rules amounts to a rejection of the existence of normative duty in international relations. Mainstream theories of international relations have maintained this viewpoint for a while (as have similarly comparable postulates in other positivist social science fields). But a rising corpus of academic research and empirical inquiry is seriously undermining it.

Scholars like Elinor Ostrom and Robert Ellickson demonstrate how even without the involvement of a supervening sovereign power, even tiny groups under restricted conditions may establish and guarantee conformity with norms. Others, such Frederick Schauer and Friedrich Kratochwil, examine how norms function in decision-making processes, whether as "reasons for action" or in determining the approaches and vocabulary of speech. Even Jon Elster agrees, saying, "I have come to feel that social norms offer a crucial kind of action incentive that is irreducible to rationality or, in fact, to any other type of maximizing mechanism. The attention that governments take in drafting and signing treaties is the best circumstantial evidence supporting the perception of a commitment to uphold them. Without a presumption that entering into a treaty commitment ought to and does restrict the state's own freedom of action and an expectation that the other parties to the agreement will feel similarly constrained, it is not conceivable that foreign ministries and government leaders could devote the amount of time and effort they do to preparing, drafting, negotiating, and monitoring treaty obligations.

Without a doubt, the effort put into crafting a treaty clause reflects the aim to both restrict the state's own commitment and make it more difficult for others to evade it. In any scenario, the venture is only rational if it is assumed that governments generally recognize a duty to uphold commitments they have signed. In the United States and other Western nations, the idea that the use of governmental authority is generally governed by the law gives national compliance with international agreements more weight. Additionally, references to legal responsibilities are a common theme in discussions of foreign policy, as well as in the ongoing criticism and justification of the foreign policy activities that dominate diplomatic correspondence and global political analysis. All of this suggests that governments function under a feeling of duty to adapt their behavior to regulating standards, just like other objects of legal regulations.

Varieties of Noncomplying Behavior

The inference is that noncompliance is the planned and purposeful breach of a treaty commitment if the state decides whether or not to comply with a treaty based on an assessment of costs and benefits, as the realists claim. Our basic premise does not rule out the possibility that such judgments may sometimes be made, particularly when the conditions supporting the initial contract have drastically altered. Or, as is the case in the sphere of international human rights, it is possible for a state to sign an international agreement only to please a home or foreign constituency, with little thought given to actually enforcing it. A cursory understanding of international relations, however, leads one to believe that treaty violations seldom qualify as deliberate disregard for the law. However, both broad observation and in-depth research often point to what seem to be or are said to be major aberrations from accepted treaty standards. What may account for this conduct if these infractions are not willful ones?

We discuss three factors that, in our opinion, frequently underlie behavior that may appear to violate treaty requirements on the surface. These factors are: (1) ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language; (2) restrictions on the ability of parties to carry out their commitments; and (3) the temporal dimension of the social and economic changes envisaged by regulatory treaties. "Causes" of noncompliance might be deemed to include these elements. But from the viewpoint of a lawyer, it is instructive to see them as "defenses" - arguments used to disprove, justify, or mitigate a violation that is apparent on the surface. A defense is subject to the paramount duty of good faith in the fulfilment of treaty duties, just like all other compliance-related matters.

Ambiguity

Like other canonical assertions of legal principles, treaties typically fail to give conclusive solutions to particular contentious problems. Language often fails to accurately capture meaning. Many potential uses, let alone their contexts, are not considered by treaty drafters. When a treaty is being negotiated, issues that are anticipated often cannot be addressed and are ignored. Circumstances in the economy, sciences, technology, and even politics change. All these unavoidable occurrences as a result of the attempt to provide guidelines for future behavior usually result in a gray area where it is hard to determine with certainty what is allowed and what is prohibited. Naturally, treaty language may vary in detail, just as other legal terminology. The range of acceptable

interpretations is increased by the generality and breadth of language. The political consensus may not support greater specificity, or, as with some provisions of the U.S. Constitution, it may be wiser to define a general direction, to try to inform a process, than to seek to foresee in detail the circumstances in which the words will be put to use. Nevertheless, there are many reasons for choosing a more general formulation of the obligation. A larger standard articulating the overall policy behind the legislation may be more successful in achieving it than a number of specific regulations if there is some trust in those who are to implement the rules. Although its language is remarkably vague, the North Atlantic Treaty has proven to be remarkably resilient: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

There are challenges with detail as well. Precision creates gaps, similar to the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, needing a process for ongoing amendment and authoritative interpretation. When things are going well, the complexity of the rule system may lead to shortcuts that minimize inefficiencies, but they may also cause conflict when the political climate becomes tense. In other words, there will often be a wide range within which parties might rationally hold different viewpoints on the nature of the obligation. In domestic legal systems, courts or other governing bodies have the authority to settle such meaning-related disagreements. If the parties agree, the international legal system may provide tribunals to resolve these disputes. However, there aren't many mandatory methods of authoritative conflict settlement accessible on a global scale, whether via adjudication or another method. Furthermore, a two-party adversarial conflict may not include the problem of interpretation. In these circumstances, a state is still free to defend its position and make an effort to persuade the other parties if there is no evidence of bad faith.

In many of these issues, a professional consensus about the legal rights and wrongs may already exist or develop. However, the matter will continue to be debatable in many more cases. Even if one party may accuse another of breaking the agreement and send armies of international attorneys to defend it, an objective observer sometimes finds it difficult to determine whether there has been any noncompliance. In fact, it may be claimed that discussions between the parties, sometimes in front of a larger audience, are an effective approach to explain the meaning of the rules when there is no official arbiter (and even when there is).

Capability

According to traditional international law, governments have reciprocal legal rights and duties with one another as well as an agreement about their future behavior. The agreement's goal is to modify state behavior. Many accords still have this straightforward connection between consent and the appropriate action. One such agreement is the LTBT. It forbids conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space, or beneath water. Nuclear weapon testing are only conducted by states, hence only state behavior is involved in the activity. The state decides whether or not it will adhere to the commitment simply by controlling its own behavior. Furthermore, there is no question regarding the state's ability to complete the task at hand. Every state is free to forego conducting atmospheric nuclear testing, regardless of how rudimentary its infrastructure or meager its resources may be. The problem of capability may come up even when just state action is in question if the treaty contains an affirmative duty. It seemed reasonable to assume in the 1980s that the Soviet Union would be able to fulfill the START agreement's need for it to destroy certain nuclear weapons. That presumption was challenged in the 1990s by the development of a collection of governments that took the place of the Soviet Union, many of which had the required technological know-how or material means to complete the task.

The issue is widespread in modern regulatory accords. Since its inception, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has focused a lot of its efforts on enhancing the domestic labor laws and enforcement of its members. The issue is acutely shown by the recent wave of environmental agreements. Such agreements are legally made between states, and the duties are framed as those of the states, such as a need to cut sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by 30% compared to a predetermined baseline. However, the true goal of such agreements is often not to influence the actions of states but rather to control the conduct of non-state actors engaged in activities that result in the production of SO2 utilizing fuels like gasoline or electricity. Several intricate intermediary processes must be completed before the final effect on the relevant private behavior can be determined. Normally, it will call for an implementing law or decree, then specific administrative rules. The state will essentially need to set up and implement a full-fledged domestic framework to guarantee the required decrease in emissions.

Despite the whims of domestic politics and legislation, it may be legitimate to hold the state responsible for failure to take the required formal legislative and administrative actions when it is "in compliance". However, creating a reliable domestic regulatory system is not a straightforward mechanical process. It involves making decisions and calls for technical and scientific acumen, administrative prowess, and financial resources. Even

industrialized Western governments have not been able to build such systems with certainty that the intended goal would be attained.

III. CONCLUSION

The paragraph above illustrates a perspective that views disobedience as endemic rather than intentional, and as an aberrant behavior rather than an anticipated one. In turn, this results in a reduction in the need of formal enforcement methods and, to a certain extent, coercive informal punishments, except in extreme circumstances. It refocuses emphasis on noncompliance causes that can be controlled via standard international political and management procedures. As a result, the problem of ambiguity can be solved by improving dispute resolution processes, the capacity gap may be filled with technical and financial support, and increased transparency will increase the likelihood that over time, national policy decisions will be brought closer and closer to accepted international standards.

These methods combine in the practice known as "jawboning," which is a sort of international enforcement operation that aims to convince the offender to alter its ways. This procedure takes advantage of the practical need for the alleged offender to explain and defend their actions. These arguments and justifications are examined and criticized in a range of formal and informal settings, both public and private. The tendency is to isolate the few instances of flagrant and purposeful violation and winnow away fairly acceptable or inadvertent failures to meet pledges that fit with a good-faith compliance norm. This technique may finally show that what may have first seemed to be ambiguous behavior is a black-and-white case of willful violation by methodically addressing and removing any mitigating factors that can potentially be raised. The offending state is left with a stark option between abiding by the norm as it is established and implemented in the specific situation and flagrantly disobeying its duty.

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