When nations are unsure about the distributional effects of their collaboration. They may do this by include the appropriate level of flexibility in their agreements. In this chapter, we provide a formal model that allows for the renegotiation of an unclear agreement in order to take fresh knowledge into account. The parties will resolve this issue as they acquire experience with the agreement and it relates to how the profits under the agreement will be divided. States are more likely to desire to shorten the agreement's term and include renegotiation the more uncertain the pact is. Noise, or fluctuation in results not coming from the agreement, works against renegotiation. Because it gets harder to see how an agreement is truly operating the more noise there is, including limited term and renegotiation clauses loses value. In a thorough case study show that the kind of uncertainty in my model matches the uncertainty felt by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty parties, who chose the course of action my model suggests.
