European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union

Mumtaz Ahmad Shah

Abstract

In order to determine when and under what circumstances the European Court of Justice would issue "adverse judgments" against member states of the European Union, we create a game-theoretic model. Three hypotheses are produced by the model. First, the less likely the Court is to base its rulings on the expected responses of member countries, the clearer the precedent set by EU case law. Second, the chance that a plaintiff government will abide by an ECJ judgement decreases as its domestic expenses increase, and thus, as the likelihood that the Court would issue such a ruling decreases. Third, the chance that respondent states would shift from individual disobedience to coordinated retaliation via new legislation or treaty changes increases with the ECJ's activity and the number of member nations negatively impacted by it. These theories are put to the test in light of three major categories of case law that are fundamental to ECJ jurisprudence: restrictions on agricultural imports, the application of the concepts of equal treatment of men and women to occupational pensions, and state responsibility for breaking EU law. The empirical study backs up our assertion that, in addition to considering previous cases, the ECJ also considers how member countries are likely to respond.