After World War II, international monetary connections were formalized as a set of legal duties for the first time in history. The International Monetary Fund was established by its Articles of Agreement, which include international legal requirements and standards of behaviour for IMF members. Up until 1977, members were expected to retain their currency at par, employ a single, unified exchange rate mechanism, and maintain an open current account. In this paper, we examine the reasons why governments agreed to follow these regulations as well as the circumstances in which they did so. The research indicates that when other nations in an area kept their promises, governments tended to do the same. Governments also abided by their obligations under international law if their domestic legal system was highly valued. Countries that have worked hard to build a solid reputation for upholding property rights are less likely to tolerate breaches of international law. However, widespread noncompliance increases the likelihood of violation, indicating that compliance behaviour should be understood in its geographical context.
