International law and international relations academics are starting a fresh conversation on adhering to international accords. This essay puts up some fundamental ideas to organize that conversation. First, it suggests that the degree of conformity with international agreements is fundamentally impossible to measure using empirical methods. It is neither a statement of fact nor even a testable hypothesis that states normally abide by the terms of their international accords, or that they do so when doing so serves their own interests. They are, instead, opposing heuristic presumptions. There are several justifications offered for the viability and use of the background assumption of a predisposition to comply. Second, compliance issues often do not result from a conscious choice to break an international agreement based on a calculation of benefit. The article offers a number of other explanations for why governments could violate their treaty duties and explains why, in many cases, such explanations are appropriately accepted by others as justifications for seeming violations of contractual standards. Third, a degree of general compliance that is "acceptable" in light of the interests and concerns the treaty is meant to defend does not need to be and should not be required of the treaty system as a whole. It is taken into account how the acceptable level is chosen and modified.
