Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post-war Europe

Gargi Singh

Abstract

International committees and courts are established by the majority of formal international human rights regimes to hold countries liable to their own populations for only internally focused activity. The literature is predominantly two sided. ''Realist'' theories contend that the strongest democracies force or persuade lesser nations to embrace standards, while ''ideational'' theories contend that transnational dissemination and persuasion processes socialize less democratic governments to accept norms. The fight against potential dangers to domestic democratic governance is delegated by governments in an egotistical manner. Therefore, newer, less established democracies will significantly choose binding and enforceable human rights responsibilities rather than existing, strong democracies. I put this claim to the test using the European Convention on Human Rights, which is now the most effective system of formal international human rights safeguards. The republican liberal account is supported by the historical record of its formation, which includes national views, negotiation strategies, and private discussions. My argument is then theoretically generalized and applied to other human rights regimes, the coordination of conservative reaction, international trade, and monetary policy. Governments are said to give up sovereignty to international regimes in order to reduce domestic political uncertainty and "lock in" more credible policies.